1. Introduction
Global population growth is a
topic of great concern to
scholars interested in the social and economic development of states.
Indeed, it is topic of great concern to scholars in many fields
because it is believed to have substantial and long range impact on all
human and ecological systems, from competition for employment to the
destruction of natural environments. Eighteenth century economist
Thomas Malthus was one of the first scholars to prophesy the dire
effects of 'overpopulation'-- his work is responsible for economics
being referred to as 'the dismal science'. Malthus, in his
Essay on
Population calculated the geometical increase of humanity
versus the
arithmetical increase of food production and predicted that population
growth would eventually expand beyond the production of food leading to
growing misery, war, pestilence and world wide famine.(1) Schools of
thought adopting this perspective have come to be known as Malthusian
with more recently a Neo-Malthusian theory being bandied about in
population control scholarship as well. This perspective very clearly
'blames the victim'
In recent years, the past two to three
decades, population
theories focussing more on the distribution of resources and the
economic and social welfare of the poor as a means to control fertility
have become more widely accepted. However, this line of scholarship
requires that governments address the uneven benefits of modernization
and capitalist expansion and the failure of 'trickle-down' economics in
developing countries. It is far easier to blame cultural factors for
the prevalence to produce more offspring and exhort the governments of
developing countries to control the fertility of their increasing
population of poor citizens. The unpleasant fact is that, while there
is gross inequity in the global distribution of wealth and resources,
as well as gross inequity in this distribution within states, social
and cultural factors in the world's two most populous states, China and
India
, do exaccerbate population growth. This is where the question of
how and why to control population expansion becomes rather more
confusing.
"Evicted Squatters in Dhaka, Bangladesh" P1
At the state level, a proportionally
high rural population with
the tendancy to rapid expansion strains state resources in the areas of
health, education, and other social services. China, with just such a
population, has instititued means to confront this issue head-on,
despite the contradiction between methodology and Marxist ideology
which postulates that adequate distribution of resources will naturally
control population expansion. The irony of this fact is that modern
development scholarship's viewpoint of population control agrees
substantially with Marxist philosophy, but China's reality has
demonstrated that more direct population control measures have been
necessary in order to achieve the initial infrastructure of a modern
socialist economy. What would now appear to be in order is a
reassessment of the strength of China's committment to
Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong theories of income distribution to achieve
more natural population control, as is counselled by modern theory.
It is the purpose of this paper to
explore the issue of
population control in China through an examination of the methods
instituted since 1949, and their effectiveness. These methods have
undergone significant change since that time, and the catalyst for
those changes will be analyzed. The effects of economic development on
population, and vice versa; the challenges of culture and tradition
will be discussed, as well as the theory beginning to gain greater
recognition in population control scholarship, Female Autonomy. I will
argue that the Family Planning Policies developed by the Chinese
government are sound and necessary, although the Chinese Communist
Party has not always correctly interpreted the cause and effects of
overpopulation, and the methods undertaken have been harmful, as well
as fatal, to many people. Finally, it is the author's contention that
current economic policies may be detrimental to China's efforts to
maintain a sustainable population level. From the analysis of these
factors conclusions will be drawn as to the cause and effect of
population control in China and other countries in similar
circumstances.
"Chairman Mao proclaiming the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic
on October 1, 1949" P2
2.Marxist-Lenist-Mao
Zedong Thought
Karl Marx
believed that no explicit measures toward controlling
population expansion would be necessary in a communist society because
overpopulation was a result, not a cause, of poverty. In describing
population growth in relation to a capitalist society he stated, "The
growth of capital there goes hand in hand with the increase in the
proletariat: they are two producers burgeoning at opposite poles of one
and the same process."(2) Being a follower
and
implementor of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Mao Zedong also believed that China's
population would expand in controlled fashion in accordance with a
planned economy. Furthermore, prior to communist party rule, the
population had been kept largely in check by a very high mortality
rate. At times in China's history increased reproduction was
encouraged to provide an adequate army and tax base for the
emperors.
The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) inherited this high mortality
rate and a population level fluctuating under the scourge of disease
and malnutrition. A primary goal of the CCP upon coming to power was
to improve the condition of its most valuable resource by ensuring the
provision of adequate health care.
"A woman doctor of the PLA leading a medical team in Hainan among the
poor" P3
The methods they undertook to provide basic medical care are nothing
short of extraordinary. Logically, good health is only possible in the
absence of disease, therefore, the CCP emphasized preventive medicine
and personal hygiene and sanitation to elim-inate the illnesses which
they did not have the personnel to cure. They mobilized the masses to
eliminate "the four pests--mosquitoes, flies, rats and sparrows--and,
in general, to clean up the cities and the countryside."(3) Great
emphasis was placed on training physicians and, in the interim,
training public health workers in the administration of basic remedies
and minor procedures. Mobile medical units were created to visit
remote villages until more permanent health care facilities could be
established in rural areas. Communes were provided with clinics and
the ministrations of 'barefoot doctors'--workers who were trained to
"provide first aid, give inoculations and carry out simple health
procedures."(4)
"A 'barefoot doctor' giving acupuncture treatment to a patient in
Yunnan" P4
The result of the vastly improved health of the Chinese people meant a
lower mortality rate, of both infants and adults, and therefore a
sizeable growth in population.
The first recognition that population
growth may hinder
progress came in 1954, after the results of the first official census
of 1953. A prominent member of the National People's Congress, Shao
Li-tzu, expressed concern over population growth, for which he was
soundly criticized. Birth control was seen at that time as contrary to
the communist philosophy of 'labour being the most valuable form of
capital'. Furthermore, this line of thought seemed to agree with the
despised rhetoric of Malthus, that large populations were the scourge
of the world's resources, which has been soundly criticized by Marx and
Mao Zedong: "The absurd argument of Western bourgeois economists like
Malthus that increases in food cannot keep pace with increases in
population was not only throughly refuted in theory by Marxists long
ago, but has also been completely exploded by the realities of the
Soviet Union and the Liberated Areas of China."(5) However,
disagreement continued. Opinions supportive of birth control
necessarily distanced themselves from Malthusian theory and proposed
instead that birth control was vital to ensure the health of mothers
and infants. The issue was debated in the press and in the Party until
by 1956 sufficient support had risen to provide the authority to
implement a birth control campaign. Premier Zhou Enlai instructed the Ministry of Public
Health to "disemminate propaganda and take effective measures for birth
control."(6) The campaign took off and
mobilized people at every level of health care and labour organizations to bring
contraception to the people.
A Birth Control Research Committee was set up to
'coordinate experience and research in contraception', numerous
educational campaigns were launched by local departments of public
health, travelling exhibitions were organized and many hospitals and
clinics introduced special facilities to give advice on birth control.
Publications during that period implied that virtually everyone was
involved, from women's federations, trade unions and the Red Cross
Society, to cadres, school teachers and ordinary workers and
peasants.(7)
However, changing attitudes in the
party and the press during the Great
Leap Forward, when a perceived threat of 'the right' ran rampant
through Party ranks, again began to characterize birth control as a
bourgeosie method of killing off the Chinese people. As a result, the
birth control policy declined as quickly as it had begun. During the
food shortages of the period from 1959-1961 the death rate increased
and then leveled off again during the Cultural Revolution, when
increased death through disease is reported to have occured primarily
in urban areas, thus the population did not expand at the rate it had
during the 1950's. Throughout this time, birth control remained
available and sterilization and abortion continued to be legal and
could be obtained, although the facilities for such procedures were
limited. Following the hard times of the Great Leap Forward and the
Cultural Revolution, the birth rate again began to rise--27 per 1,000
in 1962, and 33 per 1,000, in 1963.
Although Marxist ideology theorized
that population control in
a communist society would not be necessary, Marx's model did not
include cultural pressure to reproduce, nor perhaps the social and
economic infrastructure challenges facing China's new socialist
government. Other methods had to be sought to bring population growth
in line with economic growth to prevent the former from outstripping
the latter. Premier Zhou Enlai again pressed for "the incorporation of
population targets into the planning process."(8)
"Chairman Mao and Premier Zuo Enlai enjoying a fireworks display . . . on
National Day, 1 October" P5
3.Family Planning
Becomes Long-Range
Planning
The first inclusion of population
control in long range
planning occurred in 1965 with the goal of reducing "population growth
to 10 per 1,000 by the end of the twentieth century."(9) A Family
Planning Commission was created and the Family Planning initiative
advocating ‘one couple, one child' was adopted. Couples were enouraged
through a variety of means such as public education, door to door
distribution of contraceptive supplies, how-to pamphlets etc. to have
planned births. The three pillars of the policy were the requirement
for delayed marriage--under the Marriage Law, 18 for women and 20 for
men--limited number of births and adequate spacing between births. The
required 'household registration' which fulfilled a variety of social
and economic purposes for the government, and listed the number of
occupants of the household and their status, became a useful tool for
family planning. Children of marriage age were monitored and their
marriage noted by the local authority. Married couples were expected
to limit their procreation to one child at best and more than one only
in exceptional circumstances.
The long range goal of a 10 per 1,000
fertility rate was to be reached by annual decreases of 1 per 1,000.
The China Report
compares this approach to other
government "target-oriented" policies implemented for material
production: "Numerical targets were routinely used to set output levels
and stardards of performance, quarterly, annually, and five-year
targets for child bearing would be passed down to the local cadres."(10) From a Western prespective this type of
pragmatism with regard to such a human concern as procreation may seem
inappropriate, but if control of population expansion was required the
Chinese socialist government could not be expected to leave something
so important as the continued health of the proletariat and the
economic well-being of the state to chance and tradition.
4.Post Mao Reform - The
Deng Xiaoping Era
With realistic targets and policies
relying primarily on
propaganda and voluntary participation, the program enjoyed a slow and
steady decrease in fertility levels. However, in 1976 with the death
of Mao Zedong and the climate for change which ensued, new targets for
population control again became a political issue. Although the food
problem had been solved, and health and education improved, poverty,
and more recently discontent with the inability of the government to
alleviate poverty, continued to be a thorn in the side of the CCP. The
new Party line held that in order to rectify the impoverished state of
the peasantry, population control would have to be held further in
check. In 1979, under the direction of Hua Goufeng the CCP attempted
to accelerate the success of the population policy by implementing
increasingly strict control over reproduction with the the goal of
"under one percent within three years"(11) in
their sights. During
this time of struggle for leadership supremacy between ideological
forces in the party--the 'conservatives' headed by Hua Goufeng and the
'reformers' led by Deng Xiaoping--economic reform became the raison
d'etre of population growth targets. The speed and flexibility of
Family Planning policies changed with the ebb and flow of power
politics. As a show of reform initiative, Hua Goufeng decreased the
state quota, changing the long range target for 1985 from "9 per 1,000
to the unrealistic level of 5 per 1,000,"(12)
and pressuring local
cadres for better results. These targets were eventually recinded
along with Hua's '10 year plan'.
As Deng Xiaoping's star began to rise
in the Party firmament,
he refocussed the goals of the CCP away from class struggle and toward
the increased standard of living of the masses through changes in
economic policy. This new methodology, including such practices as
increasing the wage level of workers, providing increased opportunity
for advancement and entrepreneurship, greater mobility and greater
private ownership may have been more stimulating economically, but it
was not paralleled by more flexible population control measures. Long
range planning goals were returned to the more realistic level of 10
per 1,000, but policy implementation was given a more succinct
direction. The State Council approved a `one is best, two at most'
birth control policy with more clearly articulated programs of reward
for compliance, and punishment for second or third births.
5.Family Planning Policy
Enforcement
Enforcement of a strict "One Child
Policy" required methods
which are largely responsible for giving the Chinese Family Planning
initiative its Draconian reputation. Beginning in 1979 'One Child
Certificates' were issued in accordance with local area quotas.
Families who ignored the need for a certificate, even for a first
birth, were and continue to be, penalized with heavy fines or other
economic disincentives. "Monetary penalites for having a second child
without a permit typically vary from 10 to 50 percent of the annual
income of both the husband and the wife, imposed each year for a period
ranging from 5 to 14 years."(13) The result
of these heavy fines has
been to work in conflict with the economic reforms meant to eliminate
poverty, by increasing the poverty of many rural families by
substantially reducing their income. Punishment for families working
in state owned enterprises and/or in urban areas are more varied and
more easily enforced. Urban families not complying with Family Planning
policy could risk being denied benefits, or in more severe cases,
exclusion from promotion, demotion, deduction of salary, job loss, or
even loss of urban registration. Socially, women could be demeaned and
ostracized by their colleagues for going against Party policy.
The more direct intervention in
unplanned pregancy has been the
subject of scrutiny by human rights organizations. Unplanned or excess
pregnancies which were detected in time have been aborted, including
pregnancies as late as mid-term. Couples who had borne the limited
number of children, or a higher number, have been instructed to obtain
a tubal-ligation or vasectomy (sterilization). Human rights
organizations charge that these operations have been and continue to be
performed by (14)
Despite
the financially
debilitating punishments and the obviously beneficial rewards, many
families still choose not to comply with the 'plan'. Many peasant
couples have simply ignored the regulations, some suffering economic
penalties, others not, while wealthy families pay the fines and
continue to produce children. Studies have shown high levels of
non-compliance: in Hebei province in the early 1980's only 11% of
second or higher numbered children were born with official permission;
among peasant women only 44 percent of births, including first births,
were born with official permission, there is also evidence
demonstrating that many violations went unpunished. Couples have been
exempted from punishments or given special permits for such reasons as
the death of a first child, the first child being disabled, the parents
belonging to an ethnic minority, a parent being disabled, an overseas
returnee, or a disabled veteran. All of the characteristics listed,
under Chinese social and cultural norms, provide the justification that
the family be allowed the opportunity to produce at least one healthy
child and in many cases more than one in order to meet the income and
social security needs of the family.
6.Cultural and Social
Factors Affecting
Fertility
Two very prominent social factors which
provide justification
for increased fertility are: 1) the nation-wide preference for male
children; and 2) the rural family's need for an adequate labour force.
6.1Preference for Male
Children
"The Undesireables" P6
The cultural preference for male
offspring has been the most
problematic force opposing Family Planning Policy. Male children have
served (and continue to serve) a number of essential, traditional roles
in the Chinese family: "They continued the family line; on marriage
they remained within the parental household and supported the older
generation and finally they tended the ancestral shrines."(15) Female
children, because they leave the family home and take up residence in
their husband's home after marriage, are considered a liability to the
household in which they are born. As a drain on household resources
female children were often disposed of after birth. Female infanticide
has been practiced for centuries throughout China, both directly and
indirectly. Indirect deaths usually resulted from exposure or from
malnutrition suffered as a result of an inadequate allotment of
nutrients compared to the rest of the family. As early as 1943, a
Nationalist government publication declared that, "the drowning of girl
infants is to be prohibited."(16) Families
whose first child is a girl
will continue to conceive until at least one male child is produced.
Wealthier families would more likely raise female children until they
married, but would also have as many childen as was necessary to
produce an heir. Into the present day, government edicts have
continued to condemn the practice of disposing of girl infants and have
promoted the equality of female children as they have continued to
improve the status of women. A comic dialogue from a regional Family
Planning Office in the 1970s reminded parents: "Chairman Mao said, 'The
times have changed; men and women are the same. The things which male
comrades can do can also be done by female comrades.' Don't attach more
importance to boys and less to girls."(17)
Despite the government's efforts and
those of women's groups
operating within China and pressure from women's groups outside of
China, the preference for male children continues and in the past
couple of decades has received technological assistance from modern
medicine. The practice of determining the sex of the foetus through
amniocentisis and aborting those determined to be female has becoming
increasingly popular in modern China. According to The
Economist, this
practice is "theoretically" illegal, however, "China is now
manufacturing 10,000 ultrasound machines a year." The same article
reports that, "In the absence of interference, the true sex ratio at
birth is 106 boys for every 100 girls. But in China, the ratio has
risen from 107.2 in 1982 to 111.3 in 1989 . . . where a mother already
had one girl it was 149.4 and where she had two, it rose to an amazing
224.9."(18) Certain economic policies past
and present have
exaccerbated this bias, and the solutions which have been attempted
seem to have so far had limited effect.
6.2Rural
Economics
In the rural economy, an adequate
labour force is required to
obtain sufficient gain from subsistence or market farming. Male
children are not only considered more capable of carrying out farm
labour, (their preferential treatment at meal time ensures they are in
better health) but will also increase the families labour force by
marrying and bringing a wife and eventually children into the parental
home. For this reason, rural families perceive an even greater need
for male children than urban families. The need for the larger family
provided by a son's marriage declined somewhat during the period of
agricultural collectivization implemented in the early decades of
communist party rule.
"Production teams working on the terraced loess wheat lands of
Shensi" P7
The labour needs of the commune were spread
across the population of the collective and did not rest with each
family to produce it biologically. When economic reform
decollectivized agriculture, the political strategy anticipated that
increased autonomy in farming would provide renewed incentive for
production, and would allow farmers to increase their income by
diversifying their labour and/or selling their farm surplus in the new
socialist market economy. However, the unforseen consequence of this reform was to
re-establish the importance of male children as the most valuable form of capital to
the family farm.
7.Necessity Forces
Policy Changes
Although local cadres had been granting
permits for second
children based on the first child being a daughter, the official
authority for this practice did not come into effect until 1989. It is
largely the result of the government being caught between a rock and a
hard place. The imposition of a one child only policy encouraged
parents, especially rural parents, to seek whatever means necessary to
ensure that their one child was male, for the cultural and monetary
reasons outlined above. Parents would either dispose of female
children, avoid registering the birth of girls, or simply continue to
have more children, often under the imposition of heavy fines.
Eventually the government came to realize that the major policy
initiative aimed at increasing the standard of living of rural peasants
was in fact impoverishing a large number of them. On the other hand,
giving in to the cultural preference for female children and enacting
the 'daughter-only-household' exception reinforced the stereotype that
male children are more desireable. This policy is still in effect.
The impact of increased mobilization of
people from the rural
to urban areas and within regions seems to have both hindered and
helped the government's efforts toward population control. At times
when movement was more restricted, it was far easier for local
government to track family developments, i.e. marriages, births etc.
and enforce policy. Proof of the impact of residential stability, and
participation in government social programs, on the incidence of
fertility may lie in the far higher success rate in urban environments
than rural. While there are other factors, already discussed, which
contribute to higher fertility rates in rural environments, urban
families are much more easily monitored and have greater access to
benefits such as health care, education and employment.
The official writ of the family
planning policies did not
change substantially during the 1980's beyond those adjustments
mentioned above. What has changed and may have been more significant
is the involvement of organizations outside of the official
administration of policy and the ongoing changes to educational methods
and the increasing modernization and dissemination of health care.
Apart from these developments, it would appear that during the 1980's,
population control was regarded as necessary, through strict
enforcement, to ensure the advancement of economic development,
departing somewhat from its original intent of health promotion and
protection.
8.Family Planning in the
1990's
The Chinese government in the 1990's
has taken great steps to
pursue several alternative methods to pursuade couples that female
children are as valuable as male children.
"Family Planning - A Basic National Policy of China" note the happy family
with their girl child P8
One of the most significant is the introduction of social insurance
benefits. According to the China
Daily the China Family Planning
Association, with the support of some State departments, local
govern-ments and local township enterprises, has instituted "a series
of social benefits . . . in 13 provinces, municipalities and autonomous
regions. . . . With pension insurance, parents may get a monthly
pension to live on when they reach the age of 60."(19) Unfortuantely,
this pension scheme is tied to compliance with the Family Planning
laws.
Further efforts include increased
education and propaganda
campaigns aimed at reinforcing the official position that female
infanticide is murder and is not condoned. Official statements
condemning violence against women and children were reinforced in the
1995 White Paper. These pronouncements against violence were aimed at
coercive tactics by local officials who go to extreme lengths to ensure
quotas are met, as well as the more general incidents of familial and
cultural discrimination against women. Amnesty International credits
the Chinese government with taking these steps, but continues to report
that prosecution of offenders is uncommon. Local officials continue to
receive fines and be subject to job loss if they are unable to enforce
Family Planning Policy. In his book Governing China Kenneth Lieberthal,
notes that, "The Centre has time and again since the 1970's demonstrated its seriousness
in punishing officials whose jurisdictions run afoul of birth control
quotas."(20) And of course, the couples who
do not comply with the one child policy continue to receive financial and other economic
penalities, while those who do comply are rewarded.
Other methods to fight the uphill
battle of reduced fertility
include aggressive sex education campaigns, which are reminiscent of
the glory days of the 1950's in which mass mobilization achieved such
wide participation. During a 1997 campaign the government solicited
private funding to improve sex education materials and publicity
methods. One particular enterprise, "the Chengdu Enwei Group in
Sichuan Province donated 13 million yuan ($1.5 million) for the event
which . . . lasted for half a year."(21)
Financial support has also
been forthcoming from international sources. The International Planned
Parenthood Federation has affiliate organizations in China, for
which
they provide financial support as well as training and educational
materials. Also involved in joint projects with the State Family
Plannning Commission are the US Ford Foundation and (interestingly) the
US Public Media Centre.
9.Population Control and
Women's Rights
Primarily due to outside pressure in
the late 1980's and
increased international involvment in Family Planning projects in the
1990's, the focus of Family Planning in China as being a 'women's
issue' has gained prominence. Events such as the Beijing World
Conference for Women in 1995, highlighted reforms required in the
implementation of Chinese human rights laws pertaining to the
protection of women.
"The Presidium at work." World Conference for Women
1995 P9
Increasingly vocal women's groups such as the Chinese Women's
Federation and their international counterparts are bringing the issue
of women's health to the forefront of the population control debate in
China and around the world. Rather than being seen as simply the means
to an economic development end, population control must begin to be
seen as a benefit arising from improved health care and increased
personal autonomy
for women. It is urgent that women's choices
regarding their reproductive health be addressed as a life saving
issue. Illness associated with gynaecological problems, often caused
by improper use of birth control, and complications during child birth
are killing 600,000 women around the world annually.
There is compelling evidence which
shows a direct correlation
between increased female autonomy and fertility decline; and points to
its being a greater contributing factor to population stability than
the per capita income increase associated with economic development.
Evidence of this fact exists in the "remarkable declines in fertility
in a few countries with low per capita incomes (Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Cuba, the Indian state of Kerala) [where] there has been greater access
to social resources such as health care and education, particularly for
women."(22) The aim of this argument is to
shift the focus away from
'birth control' and toward personal control of one's life choices.
Offering women the option of birth control and instructing them in its
use is an important part of improving the health of women, but it is
only one step in involving women in the development process. The most
recent theory to emerge in population control debate is the Female
Autonomy Theory which argues that, "Women's lack of social power and
autonomy is an explanation of higher fertility. However, women's
empowerment should be an aim in its own right. Fertility reduction is
viewed as a secondary aim to be adopted by women themselves according
to their needs and desires. In other words, fertility decline comes as
part of a bigger package."(23)
The broader implications of women's
rights addresses the
underlying social and cultural norms which support higher fertility
rates. China has attempted to address these issues through instituting
and protecting women's rights, and increasing women's health care,
employment and education opportunities, but it is still not clear that
the connection between these aspects of female empowerment and
declining fertility has been made. A. Z. Hilali claims that by 1986
the view that economic development is the key to reducing birth rate,
rather than the opposite approach, began to gain wider legitimacy in
Chinese government. The CCP has always held the official position that
women must 'hold up their half of the sky', but still the missing piece
of the puzzel--emancipation of women as a vital ingredient of human
development--has not achieved government recognition, either in China
or the rest of the world. Perhaps it is the simple result of millenia
of male dominance producing the inevitable viewpoint that nothing so
important as economic and social stability could require empowering
women.
The truth of this statement can be seen
in the ongoing Chinese
preference for male offspring (this can also be said for several other
Asian states). Despite the overwhelming logic that fewer female births
will, in time, result in fewer adult females, and the statistical
evidence beginning to prove this hypothesis, the average Chinese male
does not seem to understand the gravity of the situation. A 1994
article in the New York Times examined the increasing
difficulty
Chinese men over 30 experience in finding a bride. Despite the ratio
of three men to every two women, men continue to insist that their
brides be "several years younger, and less educated." A social worker
employed in a "government sponsored dating service" (a situation worthy
of further examination in itself) describes the criteria set by her
primarily male clientele, "The men always ask for beautiful girls," she
said, "and I tell them that they must be realistic. The goals they set
must not be too high, because there are not enough women." One
particularly despondent 23 year old man, Meng Yuchang, speculated that,
"Without enough women, maybe we will all become monks, . . . and maybe
then the women will feel sorry for us."(24)
It is doubtful that Meng
would get much sympathy from the Chinese Women's Federation.
"women can hold up their half of the sky" Communist Party
slogan P10
10.Population Control
and Environmental
Sustainability
The argument that 'over-population' is
a threat to
environmental sustainability is at the heart of Neo-Malthusian
rhetoric. I have presented the argument that, while increased economic
opportunities can have a decreasing effect on fertility, it is now more
properly understood that it is the social benefits usually connected
with economic reform, rather than monetary gain itself, which have the
greatest affect on fertility rates. Just as Neo-Malthusians would have
us believe that people are poor because they have too many children,
they would also convince us that the planet is in danger because there
are too many poor people who have no concern for the environment.
Both of these arguments are a smoke screen for the reality which the
beneficiaries of the Malthusian doctrine wish to hide.
The fact is that the elements of
environmental degradation:
pollution, deforestation, resource depletion, and energy consumption,
occur in far higher proportion in the wealthy countries of the North
than in the highly populated regions of the South. The original
Malthusian argument which claims that high populations consume more
than their share of food does not convince philosopher Peter Singer:
"People in poor contries consume, on average, 400 lbs of grain a year,
while North Americans average more than 2000
lbs."(25)
"Growth in world food production compared with population
growth" P11
And the consumption does not end with food, Arguably, it is those
countries which are near or below population replacement level (as in
Western Europe) which are the greatest consumers of non-renewable
resources. Here, too, the worst environmental dangers are created, in
the guise of acid rain, nuclear 'accidents' etc., and it is here that
economic interests motivate the practices of deforestation and
overexploitation of the soil and the sea, from which threats to the
world's environment are generated.(26)
The cause behind the consumption is not
the necessity of
meeting the basic needs of a large and rapidly growing population, but
rather an average rate of consumption per person that goes far beyond
basic needs. For the average consumer in North America and Western
Europe desires have been turned into needs by talented advertising
companies who earn billions of dollars each year convincing wage
earners of the validity of their next purchase. These purchases in
turn generate profits for large corporations which are producing far
beyond the needs of the markets they serve. In comparison with the
lifestyle of the average absolutely poor person in the developing
world:
Those who are absolutely affluent . . . have more
income than they need to provide themselves adequately with all the
basic necessities of life . . . [they] choose their food for pleasures
of the palate, not to stop hunger; they buy new clothes to look
fashionable, not to keep warm; they move house to be in a better
neighbourhood or have a play room for the children not to keep out the
rain; and after all this, there is still money to spend on books and
records, colour television, and overseas
holiday.(27)
11.Will Chinese
Socialism Die of 'Consumption?'
Approximately 20% of the world's
population has emassed 80% of
the world's wealth. But it would be misleading to attribute entirely
the state of uneven distribution to the inhabitants of the North.
There are elite populations within every state who have a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo of profit for the few and toil
for the many. It is for this elite minority that Malthus created his
theory. As Allen and Thomas explain, "Malthus was renowned for his
support of the landed gentry, which blinded him to the view that
extreme misery was caused not so much by diminishing returns to labour
as population grew but by the lack of political bargaining power of
the peasantry vis-a-vis landlords."(28) The
'landed gentry' of the
21st century are the wealthy capitalist societies, the corporations
which run them, and the individuals which benefit from their profits.
The desire to have material wealth and
possessions far beyond
what is required to meet one's basic needs is growing globally because
it is generated globally. There are no limitations to economic gain in
the presence of free trade. Increasingly in the electronic age,
corporations hire, fire, buy, sell and even produce with fewer
restrictions and less human input. The socialist society that Marx,
Lenin and Mao Zedong envisioned valued workers as the ultimate form of
capital. The new world order values profit above all else.
'The Great Helmsman' vs 'The Real Thing' P12
There is disagreement both inside and
outside China as to
whether the CCP has gone too far with economic reform, whether it is
headed down the road to capitalism. The Third Plenary Session of the
14th Central Committee adopted a set of 'socialist market' principles
which included the intention to "implement the principle of more pay
for more work and rationally widen the income gap."(29) Presumably
the goal of this policy was to increase competition in the workplace
and create the incentive for increased production. There is nothing
wrong with the Chinese government wishing to provide for its people a
healthy and comfortable standard of living, but let us all hope that it
carefully guages the parameters of 'comfortable'. The US, a country
with only 5% of the world's population currently consumes 30% of the
world's resources (as pointed out previously, a figure far in excess of
its needs) China with its population of 20% of the global mass would
require 120% of the world's resources to consume at the rate that the
US currently 'enjoys'.
Socialism with Chinese characteristics
has already been accompanied by
the hallmarks of competition taken too far. Jiang Zemin, in a report
delivered to the 15th Party Congress described some of the ill effects
of market reform: "corruption, extravagance and waste and other
undesireable phenomenon are still spreading and growing . . . the
relationship between income and distribution has yet to be straightened
out."(30) As China's market economy grows,
will the gap between rich
and poor grow as well? It is the goal of the US to coerce China into
transforming its economy into one which is entirely market driven.
With the tutilage of American economists China could one day boast such
statistics as: "The net worth of the nation's 834,000 richest families
now totals over $5.62 trillion. In contrast, the net worth of the
bottom 90 percent of American families is only $4.8 trillion. Less
than 1 percent of the American population now exerts unprecendented
power over the American economy."(31)
12.Conclusion
The reality that global economic
inequity results in global
poverty is a problem which governments do not want to address.
Scholars write about it, NGOs report on it, idealistic university
students lament it, but the players at the top blame poverty on
overpopulation, ethnic conflict, islamic fundamentalism, communist
oppression and any other scape goat that doesn't require wealthy
nations to reduce consumption. The sad fact is that China may be on
the verge of joining the march to over consumption through increased
foreign trade and investment. China has not had a sterling
environmental record--it has put industrial production above
environmental concerns--but it has had an ideology which insisted that
every citizen have a job and that no one sector of the population is
allowed to earn excessive amounts while others starve. It had a
population control policy based on the health of women and infants and
initiated by the need to ensure that everyone's basic needs were met,
that they were fed, sheltered and educated. Now China it is
incorporating McDonalds and IBM into its economy, technologizing its
industry and laying off Chinese workers, many of them women. Plunging
working women back into poverty is not the way to ensure a low
fertility rate. China teeters on the brink of something which could
destroy the vision of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought, which Jiang
Zemin reveres. He was quoted in the Beijing Review as
stating, "Population growth and economic development have caused great
strains on resources and the environment."(32)
He is half right. The kind of economic development China is
potentially headed toward will no doubt wreak greater havoc on
its environment, and that of the rest of the globe.
This paper will have achieved its aim
if it has convincingly argued that the fertility rate of a nation is a
complex equation of economic opportunity, social benefit, female
autonomy and gender equity. It is an issue which must be approached
with an open mind, a willingness to listen and the courage to probe the
underlying and contributing social factors and family dynamics. Only
when women are truly given the power of choice, will we begin to
realize population stability.
Notes
1.Tim Allen and Alan
Thomas eds., Poverty and Development in the 1990's (Milton
Keynes: Oxford University Press, 1992) 85.
2.Karl Marx, Karl
Marx: Selected Writings, ed. D. McLellan (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1977) 518.
3.Leo A. Orleans,
Every Fifth Child (London: Eyre Methuen Limited, 1972) 50.
4. Orleans 51.
5.H. Yuan Tien,
China's Population Struggle (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1973) 178.
6.Orleans 40.
7.Orleans 40.
8.A. Z. Hilali,
"China's Population Growth: Policy and Prospects," China Report
33.1 (1997): 2.
9.Hilali 2.
10.Hilali 2.
11.Hilali 2.
12.Hilali 2.
13.Hilali 2.
14.Huang Wei, "Fujian
Booms with Less Population," Beijing Review December 22-28 1994:
19.
15.Elizabeth Croll,
"Introduction: Fertility Norms and Family Size in China," China's
One Child Family Policy, eds. Elizabeth Croll, Delia Davin and
Penny Kane (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985) 11.
16.Orleans 36.
17.Office of Family
Planning, "Changing Customs and Habits: Family Planning in Literature
and Art," Chinese Approaches to Family Planning, trans. Robert
Dunn, ed. Leo A. Orleans, (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1979)
52.
18."The Lost Girls,"
The Economist (September
18th, 1994).
19.Cui Ning, "Family
Planners Build Insurance for Rural Areas," China Daily [WWW
Edition] 19 January 1998 URL:
http://chinadaily.com.cn.net/cndy/cd_cate1.html
20.Kenneth Lieberthal,
Governing China, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995) 310.
21.Cui China
Daily.
22.Allen and Thomas
88-89.
23.Gita Sen,
"Fertility decline and women's automony: another look," paper presented
at the International Economics Association (Athens, 28 August- 1
September 1989) cited in Allen and Thomas p. 91.
24.Philip Shenon,
"Chinese Bias Against Girls Creates Glut of Bachelors," New York
Times 28 August 1994: A1, A4.
25.Peter Singer, "Rich
and Poor," Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians, ed. Eldon
Soifer, 2nd ed. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1997) 209.
26.Allen and Thomas
85.
27.Singer 210.
28.Allen and Thomas
85.
29."Decision of the
CPC Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a
Socialist Market Economy," Beijing Review (November 22-28,
1993).
30.Jiang Zemin, "Hold
high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory for an all-round
advancement of the cause of building socialism with Chinese
characteristics," Beijing Review (October 6-12, 1997) 13.
31.Jeremy Rifkin,
The End of Work (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1995) 174.
32.Jiang 13.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Photo Credits
P1.Oxfam, in Tim
Allen and Alan Thomas eds., Poverty and Development in the
1990's (Milton Keynes: Oxford University Press, 1992) 84.
P2.Stuart
Schram, Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1966)
P3.T.R. Tregear,
How They Live and Work: The Chinese (Newton Abbott: David &
Charles Limited, 1973) 103.
P4.Tregear
104.
P5.Tregear 54.
P6."The Lost
Girls," The Economist (September 18th, 1994).
P7.Tregear 34.
P8.Maggie Murray for
"Format" in Allen and Thomas 93.
P9.Xu Xiangjun for
The Beijing Reiew, October 2-8, 1995: 5.
P10.Courtesy of
Dr. Sciban, Asian Languages Department, University of Calgary.
P11.Allen and Thomas
84.
P12.Simpson, Thin Black
Lines, in Allen and Thomas 267.
This site has been created as part of an undergraduate paper
competition. The paper was written by Roberta Abbott for a University
of Calgary course, the Politics of Development in China, under the
instruction of Dr. Ron Keith.
