The history of the Bakun Hydroelectric Project extends back more than thirty years, and includes the following phases:

• early 1960s: initial survey of the hydro potential of Sarawak
• late 1970s - early 1980s: detailed examination of the Bakun Site, and
  preparation of development proposals
• 1986: decision by national government to build the project
• 1990: postponement of the project
• 1993: renewal of the project
• 1994: awarding of project contract to Ekran Berhard
• 1996: construction begins
• 1997: probable completion of diversion tunnels
• 2003: projected date of completion

Initial proposals
The hydro potential of Bakun was first surveyed in the early 1960s, by the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority of Australia, under the Colombo Plan aid program. In 1977 a more detailed study by Sesco (Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation), identified numerous potential hydroelectric sites, including Bakun. The Masterplan Study for Power System Development in 1981 estimated that Sarawak's technically utilizable
potential was about 87,000 GWh per annum, equivalent to an installed capacity of 20,000 MW at a 50% plant factor. Most of the preferred sites were located in the Upper Rajang River watershed.

The engineering and economic aspects of the larger proposed projects, as well as the necessary transmission lines, were subsequently studied, focusing on the Pelagus and Bakun projects on the Rajang River. Beginning in October 1981, the SAMA Consortium of German and Swiss consultants (composed of Lahmeyer International of Frankfurt, Fichtner of Stuttgart, Dorsch Consult of Munich, and Motor Columbus of Baden) on behalf of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation, and with the support of the
Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation (SESCO) and the National Electricity Board of Malaya (NEB), evaluated the feasibility of the Bakun project. In a November 1983 report, the SAMA Consortium recommended that the Bakun project be implemented as early as possible, by 1995. The Bakun Project would replace the use of coal, natural gas, or oil for power generation, thereby saving on import costs, and possibly permitting more of these
resources to be exported. It was also concluded that while thermal power plants would be slightly cheaper to build, a dam at the Bakun site would have lower operating costs. This study defined the basic features of the Bakun Project, as a dam 204 m in height (the largest in South East Asia), of concrete arch construction, generating 2400 MW, or 18,000 GWH/year, at an average plant factor of 88%, and creating a reservoir of 695 sq. km. The
project would require about 12 1/2 years to be completed. Overall, by 1985 as much as M$37 million had been spent on feasibility studies of the project.

The Bakun Project was envisaged as one phase of the overall development of Sarawak's hydroelectric resources, with development at the Murum site proposed to begin several years after Bakun. A feasibility study for the Pelagus Project was also completed in 1982. This study concluded that this project would not be viable unless the Bakun Project was constructed upriver, because of the risk of early reservoir sedimentation. The Bakun Dam, it was envisaged, would trap much of the sediments that would otherwise flow into the Pelagus reservoir.

Sources:
o Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation, "Pelagus/Bakun Hydro-Electric Projects: Ecological Impact," (German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., SAMA Consortium), July 1982. [A preliminary study, it concluded that the reservoirs "would disturb the ecosystem of the Rajang River basin," and that negative effects could be reduced "to an acceptable level if the preventive measures suggested in the report are realized" p.1.]
o Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation, "Bakun Hydro-Electric Project: Feasibility Report: Executive Summary," (German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd., SAMA Consortium), November 1983. [Concludes that project is technically feasible, and highly advantageous economically. Project will have some negative environmental impacts, but they can be reduced with appropriate management. Recommends that project be implemented as early as possible, by 1995.]

Initial Controversy in the 1980s
By 1983 these studies and proposals had engendered considerable controversy within Malaysia. Proponents argued that the project had several benefits, and minimal, or at least manageable, impacts. For the residents of the region, it would be a source of employment during construction, and would stimulate indirectly creation of other employment opportunities. Increased cash income for these residents was advocated as the only means to change the "backward" status of this region, and to address poverty. The
project was also seen as providing a major impetus for development of all of Sarawak, and ultimately, of Malaysia.

Source for government views of the project in the 1980s:
o Malaysia Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts, "Project Information: Bakun Hydroelectric Project," March 1986. [Attributes a range of economic, environmental and social benefits to the dam, and minimal negative impacts. The link between certain claims, and knowledge available at that time regarding potential benefits and impacts, appears to be tenous. For example, regarding the potential for water-borne diseases, such as bilharziosis, this report notes that the "future Bakun reservoir shore conditions are not considered to be a favourable environment for these
diseases to flourish" (p.14). This may be compared with the conclusion in SESC (1982) (the preliminary ecological impacts study), that "[s]chistosomiasis (Bilharziosis) has to be considered as a potential and serious threat in the future lakes" (p.23)].

However, for others, the dam's potential consequences were of greater concern. Human implications included the displacement of about 4,500 inhabitants, belonging to the Kajang, Kenyah, Kenyah-Badang, Kayan, Penan and Ukit peoples. The displacement and resettlement of these people in effect involved the loss of their way of life, and the acceptance of a "modern" lifestyle. By the early 1980s experience in other water development projects had already shown that resettlement of displaced communities is
fraught with complications and unexpected problems, rarely providing a positive outcome.

Besides flooded forests and displaced inhabitants, concerns included the possibility of dam collapse, earth tremors, new waterborne diseases (including shistosomiasis, opisthorchiasis, malaria and filariasis), disruption of downstream water quality, and sediment accumulation behind the dam that would render it useless within fifty years. Construction of the dam would also result in loss of approximately 23,000 ha of good agricultural land. There were also questions about the economic costs of the project. It was assumed in the 1980s that much of the necessary capital would be raised through loans from international agencies such as the World Bank and/or the Asian Development Bank. These loans would likely substantially increase Malaysia's foreign debt. It was even unclear whether the nation, then in recession, needed so much electricity. Groups opposing the project, within Malaysia, in the mid-1980s included the Environmental Protection Society
of Malaysia, and the Bakun Residents' Action Committee. Controversy, and opposition to the project, had begun by 1983.

Sources for concerns regarding the project in the mid-1980s (see also Chapter V).
o Apin, Teresa, "Southeast Asia's Biggest Dam Threatens to Displace 5,000 Natives," Third World Network Features, 1986.
o Bakun Dam Committee, Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia, "Forum on The Bakun Hydro Electric Power Project," Feb. 22, 1986. [Speakers included: Gurmit Singh, Bong Hon Min, Colin Nicholas, Y. B. Sim Kwang Yang].
o "Bakun: Between Energy & Tragedy," Utusan Konsumer, February 1986.
o "SAM campaigns against huge Rajang River dams," The Borneo Bulletin, Sept. 17, 1983.
o Bakun Residents' Action Committee (BRAC), "Bakun H.E.P. Sarawak, Malaysia: Discussion Paper" with "Call for International Support," October 17, 1985.
o "Bakun differing opinions," Sarawak Tribune, March 21, 1985.

From the beginning, access to information about the project has been an important element in the controversy. As of 1985, none of the feasibility studies had been released to the public. According to one report by project opponents, "[p]ublic discussion on the issue was found to be at all time low, for such a massive project of national importance". This had two immediate consequences for debates concerning the project. First, dam opponents
sought, as a key strategy, to provide information about the project and its impacts, to encourage debate. Second, the secrecy with which decisions concerning this project were being made became itself a major focus of controversy, independent of the specific benefits and impacts of the project itself.

By 1986 the Malaysian government had decided to proceed. However, protests by indigenous peoples affected by the project, and by other concerned Malaysians, as well as doubts about economic viability, led Mahathir to shelve the Bakun Project. He announced the decision at the June 1990 international conference on conservation of tropical biodiversity. Mahathir claimed that this decision demonstrated Malaysia's commitment to conservation. Doubts concerning the project's economic viability, particularly its impact on Malaysia's foreign debt, may have been another consideration.

Project revival in the 1990s
Even after the project had been shelved in 1990, lobbying by its proponents
continued, particularly by the Sarawak government, which urged the federal government to revive the project. In 1992, even as the federal government was asserting that it was continuing to debate the project, and that it had ordered additional feasibility studies, Sarawak officials were claiming that the federal government had assured them the project would go ahead. On September 9, 1993, the Malaysian cabinet approved construction of the Bakun Dam project. This followed approval of the project by the Economic Planning
Unit in the Prime Minister's Department, in July 1993.

But at first it was uncertain what exactly had now been approved. One early report described a project supplying up to 36,000 MW (seven times the output of the Churchill Falls project), through a series of "cascading dams". Other reports suggested that the project would produce 16,000 MW, through a series of four or five dams, each creating a small lake, together avoiding the environmental consequences of a single large reservoir. By October 1, however, the project had been defined more precisely as a single dam,
generating 2400 MW, at a cost of approximately $7 billion Canadian.

Sources:
o "Bakun gets the nod," Sarawak Tribune, Oct. 26, 1992.
o "Go-ahead for Bakun project in Sarawak," New Straits Times, Oct. 26, 1992.
o "Bakun best best for cheap power -- CM," Sarawak Tribune, Nov. 5, 1992.
o "Bakun project won't endanger environs: EPU," Borneo Post, Nov. 12, 1992.
o "KL approves RM10 mil for study on Bakun project," Borneo Post, March 13, 1993.
o "Bakun project to go ahead: Chan," Borneo Post, April 20, 1993.
o "Malaysia: Go-Ahead for New Bakun Power Project," Business Times (Malaysia), July 21, 1993.
o "Go-ahead for RM30.6bil Bakun project," New Straits Times, September 10, 1993.
o "2,400MW from Bakun project likely by 2005," Business Times, October 1, 1993.
o "Bakun project to be implemented next yr," Borneo Post, Sept. 10, 1993.

In reviving the project, Malaysia's need for power was most often invoked as
justification. By 1993 the Malaysian economy was growing by more than 8 percent per year, with electricity demand expanding even faster. Blackouts in 1992 and 1993, and a predicted doubling of demand by 2000, were harbingers of a power crisis, justifying extraordinary efforts to expand supply. Project proponents also believed the Bakun Dam could help reduce dependence on fossil fuels, especially oil. Most evident, however was that this project was consistent with an energy policy relying almost entirely on supply. As environmentalist Gurmit Singh noted at a seminar on the Bakun Dam in Kuala Lumpur in December 1995, "The concept of energy conservation and certainly its implementation is virtually absent in Malaysia."

Source for government perspective on the need for the project:
o "The Power Sector in Malaysia--Towards Meeting the National Requirements," in Malaysia Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1994/95,

After the project's revival in September 1993, however, it became apparent that more was at stake than just electricity. On January 30, 1994 Mahathir announced that the contract for constructing and operating the dam had been awarded, without tender, to Ting Pek Khiing, a Sarawak timber tycoon and developer, and his company, Ekran Berhad. This surprised many, because Ting had no previous experience building dams. What he did have, however, was the prime minister's confidence. Mahathir's announcement was only the public culmination of intense private lobbying, through which Ting had convinced him that his company could deliver the project quickly. Ting had also won the support of the Sarawak Chief Minister, because his proposal would further the minister's goal of the privatization of utilities, while directing business to Sarawak companies. Thus, Ting's success reflected as much his responsiveness to the political priorities of senior officials, as his ability to address Malaysia's energy needs.

In the three years since Ting won the contract, complex networks of influence have been woven around the project, linking politicians, business leaders, and members of their families. Much of the details of these networks remain secret: as one account concludes, "It is a story of which the full details may never be known, involving as it doesmaneuverings, meetings, lobbying, rapid changes of minds and deployments -- a real intrigue, mostly behind closed doors and to which the public has had little access." Motivating the participants in these networks are the prospects of large profits, through construction contracts, timber sales, and the eventual sale of electricity.

The project's revival also immediately drew attention from dam builders around the world, including Canada. In February 1994 representatives of BC Hydro, Hydro Quebec, Ontario Hydro, and several Canadian engineering firms together visited Malaysia, to promote their participation in the project. During the January 1996 trade mission to Malaysia, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien met with Mahathir, and reiterated Canada's interest in the project, while Ontario Hydro International opened an office in Sarawak, reinforcing
a relationship it had been developing for several years with Malaysian power suppliers, partly through the support of the Canadian International Development Agency. However, in recent contracts announcements, Canadian firms have been conspicuously absent, with firms from Europe, Latin America and Asia receiving major contracts for the project. Asea Brown Boveri, together with a Brazilian partner, has emerged as the major project
contractor.

When the project was announced in September 1993, the government stated that it "will give special consideration to the project to ensure it does not harm the natural environment and ecology." Construction would not begin until after public review of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) report, as required by Malaysia's Environmental Quality Act (1974).

Soon, however, the EIA process started to unravel. In early 1994 Ekran assigned preparation of the EIA report to the Kuching campus of the University of Malaysia. Progress in the study was slow; by September 1994 field work had not yet even begun. In February 1995 the EIA process was broken into four parts, so that each component of the project could be approved separately. The objective was speed: if the reservoir EIA was
approved first, forest clearing could begin before approval of the dam, transmission lines, or undersea cable. This maneuver, described by opponents as "nonsensical", aroused concern even among supporters, with a pro-government newspaper describing it as equivalent to approving a house one floor at a time.

Reinforcing the perception that the EIA process had become only a formality, Ting stated on submitting the EIAs in February 1995 that clearing of the reservoir area would soon begin, because "we are confident that all the EIAs will be approved. There is no reason for rejection because we have a team of experts and consultants to ensure measures taken in the project are in compliance with the DOE's [Department of Environment's] requirements." Government officials echoed his confidence. And six weeks later, on March 27, 1995, the first EIA was approved, without ever being released to the public.

But it was not even immediately clear who had approved it. Only on April 6 was it clarified that, retroactive to September 1994, jurisdiction over the EIA had been transferred from the federal to the Sarawak government. Unlike the federal government, the Sarawak government did not require public review of the EIA report prior to approval. Soon after, parts two and three of the EIA were also approved, again without public review.

Finally, in May 1995 the public was permitted to view the EIA report, including its optimistic conclusion, that the "proposed Bakun Hydroelectric Project will supply the nation with cheap, clean, and reliable electricity". Shortly after its release, the EIA report was evaluated by a team of experts assembled by the International Rivers Network (IRN). These experts identified numerous shortcomings in the EIA report.

The government has repeatedly demonstrated its determination to continue the project, particularly during the summer of 1996. On June 19th, high court judge James Foong, ruling in favour of three Sarawak individuals affected by the project (who had argued that they had not been adequately consulted, as required by the Environmental Quality Act), declared that the transfer of authority over the EIA from the federal to the state government was invalid. The project therefore could not continue until it met federal requirements, including public review of the EIA. Public review, Foong stated, was essential, since "the interaction between people and their environment is fundamental to the concept of impact." Further, he argued, "It makes a mockery of the whole issue to say that the EIA can be approved first and if the public has any constructive ideas, they can submit later. This certainly is illogical, deprivation of good sense and sound reasoning."

Foong's decision was hailed by environmental groups, but was viewed by the
government as, at most, an inconvenience. Officials quickly stressed that the work would continue. The federal and state governments filed four appeals, and on July 12, Ekran obtained a Court of Appeal order allowing work to proceed. Since then, momentum for the project has continued to build. During the September 1996 Sarawak elections, the major parties successfully resisted pressure to make the dam a campaign issue.
Manipulation of public perceptions also continues. In Kuching, Sarawak's capital, the most visible signs of the project are billboards extolling its contribution to the state's economic progress. (press clippings, Bernama, Kuala Lumpur)

But doubts also continue to mount. In July 1996 Delphi International, a British consulting firm, warned its clients and potential investors in the project that the Bakun Dam promised far greater risks than is typical of power projects, and lower returns. This has presented an additional obstacle to Ekran's efforts to attract foreign investment. Postponement in September 1996 of the signing of a major contract between Ekran and Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) has also hinted at the impact of the international campaign
against the project. As of June 1997, the project is continuing: diversion tunnels are under construction, although the date of their completion has been delayed; and Ekran Berhard insists that financing arrangements are in place, although there are signs of resistance among foreign investors. Today, nearly four years after announcement of the project's revival, its final outcome remains uncertain.

Sources on the project's revival:
o Spires, Caroline, "Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Bakun Hydroelectric Project, Sarawak, East Malaysia in the period from September 1993 to June 1995." University of London, Wye College, October 1995, pp.35-48. [summarizes debates and decisions concerning the project between 1993 and 1995].
o Insan, Power Play: Why the Bakun Hydroelectric Project is Damned, (Kuala Lumpur: Insan, 1996). [extensive discussion of the Bakun project -- its environmental, economic and resettlement aspects.]
o "Bakun Dammed: Surprise court ruling sours Mahathir's dream," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 4, 1996: 71. [on June 1996 decision by Justice James Foong.]
o "Bakun Dam: Test of Sincerity," Aliran Monthly, Vol. 14(5), 1994. [On the need for open discussion of the project.]
o "The Bakun Judgement: Hope And Then Despair," Aliran Monthly, Vol. 16(1), 1996. [Several articles summarizing and interpreting Justic James Foong's decision.]
o Delphi International, "Bakun: High Dam: High Risk?" 8th July 1996.