Many of the issues pertaining to the Bakun project, such as concerns about economic viability, environmental concerns, and resettlement, parallel those encountered with dam projects elsewhere in the world. At the same time, several aspects of the project reflect circumstances particular to Malaysia. Four such aspects will be noted in this chapter: the regulatory context of the Bakun project; the relationship between Malaysian citizens and their governments; the place of Sarawak within the Malaysian national political and economic contexts; and the Bakun Dam and international aid.

As already noted, the Bakun project continues to retain support within the highest official levels, including the prime minister, even as opposition continues to grow, and its dubious economic, social and environmental consequences become clearer. This is especially significant because in earlier controversies within Malaysia that have involved dams, the government has responded by canceling the project. One example, of course, is the earlier incarnation of the Bakun project in the 1980s. A second is a proposed hydropower project on the Sungai Tembeling River in Peninsular Malaysia, first announced in 1971, shelved indefinitely in 1978, revived in 1982, and canceled again the following year, apparently at least in part in response to environmental protests. A comparison of these earlier controversies with the 1990s Bakun controversy, focused on understanding why the government has become so much more determined, would illuminate the political and economic factors now in play.

Source:
o Aiken, S. Robert & Colin H. Leigh, "Hydro-electric power and wilderness protection," Impact of Science on Society, 1985-86, no. 141: 85-96. [Describes Sungai Tembeling controversy, as well as a contemporaneous dam controversy in Tasmania.]

Regulatory context
Environmental legislation relating to EIA in Malaysia and Sarawak is quite
extensive. The requirements of federal and state EIA regulations are described in Spires (1995:28+). The statutory provision within federal law for EIA of the Bakun project is the Environmental Quality Act (1974). Documents published by the federal Department of Environment, describing procedures and requirements for EIAs include extensive discussion of the need, and appropriate conduct of, public participation in the EIA process. In 1995 the Sarawak Natural Resources and Environment Board made public their own
policy and procedures for EIA. While public participation is mentioned, the state regulations, unlike the federal regulations, include no firm commitment to public participation. Instead, participation is apparently at the discretion of the project proponent.

The course of the environmental impact assessment process as applied to the Bakun dam illustrates how regulatory requirements concerning the open examination of such projects are not sufficient. Clear delineation of federal and state responsibilities is also necessary, as are specific requirements concerning the environmental impact process, including the timing of studies, public review, and decisions concerning approval. The Bakun experience demonstrates once again that EIAs done in haste, and toward the end of
the planning process, are most likely to be formalities, and will fail to integrate environmental concerns in the development process.

Source:
o Spires, Caroline, "Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Bakun Hydroelectric Project, Sarawak, East Malaysia in the period from September 1993 to June 1995." University of London, Wye College, October 1995, pp. 28-34, for analysis of provisions for public participation in federal and state EIA requirements.
o Harun, Hasmah, "Management of Water in Malaysia," Environmental Education and Information, Vol. 8(3): 165-189. [focuses on water quality.]

Malaysian citizens and their governments
A significant aspect of the Bakun project is a paternalistic attitude on the part of the government towards rural and forest dwellers, and the perceived need to impose development and modernization on them, to lift them out of poverty and dependency. For example, PBDS president Leo Moggie argued in September 1993, that "the over-dependency attitude among the rural people on the government is the main problem affecting rural development". "The only way to progress is to be self-reliant and not to be over dependent on the government's assistance. No government can help unless the people
help themselves".

Sources:
o "PBDS offers to help counter environmentalist opposition," Sarawak Tribune, Sept. 21, 1993.
o "Don't dwell on the past, Moggie tells PBDS members," Borneo Post, Sept. 21, 1993.

The Place of Sarawak within Malaysia
The legacy of colonialism remains an important factor in Sarawak. According to Colchester (1992, cited in Spires 1995), British colonization, the long effort to dispossess natives from their land and resources and crush their resistance, left them vulnerable to outside intervention, and without effective defense against external economic or political forces. Consider the words of Charles Brook, Second Rajah of Sarawak speaking to the Council Negri in 1915:

"Has it ever occurred to you that after my time out here others may appear with soft and smiling countenances, to deprive you of what is solemnly your right - that is the very land on which you live, the source of your income, the food even of your mouths? If this is lost once, no amount of money could recover it strangers and speculators will become masters and owners whilst you yourselves, you people of the soil will be thrown aside".

Since the end of colonization, the dual political structure of Sarawak, with one system of administration being an integral part of regional and national government structures, and the other centering on the longhouses and administrating customary; and the firm assertion of control over native societies, has left communities without all the capabilities needed to
assert control over their local affairs.

This colonial legacy is bound to the historical status of Sarawak as a resource hinterland within Malaysia, exporting timber, oil, and gas, while other sectors of its economy have remained relatively underdeveloped. The Sarawak government has helped perpetuate this status, encouraging rapid exploitation of resources (whether by hydroelectric development, or, to note a more widely known controversy, by logging of the Sarawak rainforests), while obstructing efforts by indigenous peoples to assert control over, or benefit from, this exploitation. This view of Sarawak as a resource hinterland, or neo-
colony" of Peninsular Malaysia, has been one factor in political opposition to the Bakun project. In this view, the project has been considered as another in a series of resource development activities that have left Sarawak in a disadvantaged state.

At the same time, the Bakun project has been portrayed by its supporters as a means to reverse Sarawak's status as a resource hinterland. From its outset, the project has been presented as means of attracting investment to Sarawak, of fostering its industrialization, so that it could develop to the same extent as, or even beyond, mainland Malaysia. New industries at Bintulu, including iron ore reduction plants, electric arc steel plants, pulp mills (using timber from the reservoir area), and (less likely) an aluminum
smelter, all of which depended on cheap electricity for their feasibility, have been seen as major potential markets for power from Bakun. Bakun would also, of course, provide power to Peninsular Malaysia, where the high rate of growth in electricity demand was projected to continue.

For the Malaysian government, the scale of the project has also provided its own justification. The Malaysian government has defined a national "vision" of full industrialization by 2020, and sees megaprojects as central to its achievement. A new international airport, highways, the world's tallest office towers in Kuala Lumpur, a new capital city--all reflect a preference for grandiose projects. The Bakun Dam--the tallest, most powerful, most expensive dam in South East Asia, expected to "kickstart" the Sarawak economy--indeed fits well within this view of development, and is clearly
envisaged as Sarawak's particular contribution to the program of megaprojects through which Malaysia intends to become industrialized.

A recent statement by the Chief Minister of Sarawak exemplifies this perspective on the Bakun Dam:

"Much has been said and written about Vision 2020, our Prime Minister's vision to turn Malaysia into a fully industrialized nation by the year 2020. Sarawak, with its abundant natural resources can play an important role to make the vision a reality.

"The Bakun Hydroelectric Project (HEP) provides an opportunity for us to contribute towards the industrialization process of the nation. The project will utilitize what the State has in abundance, yet natural and renewable, that is water. It will enable us to help the nation meet the ever increasing demand for energy as we march towards becoming a developed country. With the construction of the dam, Sarawak is set to become the Powerhouse of the Nation, as Malaysia enters the 21st century.

"The Bakun HEP is set to bring along with it the benefits of development. It will provide an opportunity for the affected people to be resettled in a new and better environment. In an effort to bring them into the mainstream of development, the Government will implement various projects such as land development schemes, new roads and a modern township cum service centre...

"The Government is confident the Bakun HEP will act as a springboard for the State's economy. It will propel the State to achieve a much higher growth and place it on part with the other more developed States in the country."

Other parties were not slow to realize these larger implications of the Bakun
project. For example, the Democratic Action Party's opposition to the project in the 1980s was based, in part, on the view that the project implied that Malaysia had made a basic decision to become industrialized. Such a decision, the DAP argued in 1985, had to be presented to the people, and decided democratically.

One example of Bakun, and Sarawak, being portrayed as a resource of national significance, is the map headed "Natural Treasure Trove," in the Far Eastern Economic Review, July 21, 1994 (reproduced in Spires 1995:54).
It is important to note that the above discussion of the implications of the place of Sarawak within Malaysia for the Bakun Dam is very preliminary. My impression is that there has not yet been significant analysis of the political economy of this project. In contrast, significant work along this line (see below) has been done on the exploitation of the Sarawak rainforest. This work could likely be applied to understanding how the Bakun Dam, like timber harvesting, another form of resource development, has come to be
viewed as important to the economic and political future of Sarawak.

Additional Links:
The campaign within Sarawak in opposition to the Bakun project has occurred in the context of a larger campaign by indigenous peoples for recognition of their right to maintain control over and access to the natural resources of this state, and particularly the forests within which they live. For more information on this larger campaign see:

The homepage of the Sarawak Peoples Campaign

The homepage of the Penan people of Sarawak:

For further information about the Penan, and about the Borneo forest
environment, and its people, with particular reference to the impacts of
logging

Source:
o "Bakun may propel state into power house," Borneo Post, Sept. 18, 1993.
o Bevis, William W., Borneo Log: The Struggle for Sarawak's Forests, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995).
o Colchester, Marcus, "Pirates, squatters and poachers: the political ecology of dispossession of the native peoples of Sarawak," Global Ecology and Biogeography Letters, 1993, 3: 158-179.
o Democratic Action Party, "A Preliminary study on the proposed Bakun hydroelectric project," October 1985.
o King, Victor T., "Politik pembangunan: the political economy of rainforest exploitation and development in Sarawak, East Malaysia," Global Ecology and Biogeography Letters, 1993, 3: 235-244.
o Wee Chong Hui, Sabah and Sarawak in the Malaysian Economy, (Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed, 1995).

The Bakun Dam and International Aid
Foreign governments, particularly through aid agencies, have played a major role in encouraging development of the Bakun project. This is reflected, for example, in the work of the SAMA Consortium, funded, in part, by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (as well as the Malaysian government and SESCO, [DAP 1985]). In its 1983 report recommending rapid construction of the project, it also noted that the "Government of the F. R. of Germany has expressed its willingness to finance the foreign consultancy services for the Tender Design of the Bakun Project including the development of the HVAC transmission grid within Sarawak." The German government also expressed its willingness to finance the foreign consultancy part of the recommended resettlement and environmental studies. This study also noted the need for immediate involvement of
international financial agencies, including the IBRD and the ADB. (As noted above, in the 1990s it has been a major objective to avoid involvement by these agencies in the project.)

In the last several years controversy has erupted in Britain concerning British funding of dams in Malaysia and elsewhere. The focus of the controversy has financial aid provided by Britain towards construction of a dam on Malaysia's Pergau River. In 1988 the British government made a commitment of $US346 million towards construction of this dam (the largest amount of aid ever provided by Britain for a single project), apparently in return for Malaysia reversing its policy of "Buy British Last" imposed in 1981 as a protest against higher fees charged to Malaysian students in Britain. This aid was also apparently tied to Malaysia purchasing approximately $US1.5 billion worth of British weapons. The decision to provide support for this dam overruled the technical and economic objections of Britain's Overseas Development Administration. This was not a unique case: a similar situation occurred as well in connection with a British-supported dam in Sri Lanka.

Sources:
o Great Britain. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee. Public Expenditure: The Pergau Hydro-Electric Project, Malaysia, The Aid and Trade Provision and Related Matters, Vol. I., (London: HMSO, 1993/94).
o Pearce, Fred, "Britain's other dam scandal," New Scientist, Feb. 26, 1994, vol. 141, no. 1914: 24-29.
o Darnton, John, "Britain Accused of Tinkering on Malaysian Dam," The New York Times, March 4, 1994.