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Popular opposition to large dam projects
has become a world-wide phenomenon. In numerous countries, this
opposition has continued and grown for many years. The variety
of ways in which opposition has emerged, grown, and influenced
(or failed to influence) water development projects in various
countries, provides many opportunities
for comparative study, particularly in terms of larger questions
concerning the role of public debate and dissent in the development
process.
In Canada, public opposition (among other factors) has led
to cancellation of some major recent projects, including the
Kemano project in B.C., and the Great Whale Project in Quebec.
In the United States, the "big dam era" is widely considered
to be over, as there no longer appear to be any sites at which
this technology would win public
acceptance. Indeed, to some extent the focus of public debate
has shifted towards the possibility of dismantling a few especially
hated projects. In Eastern Europe, opposition to dams in the
1980s was closely related to opposition to the former communist
regimes. In Hungary, Latvia, the Soviet Union and elsewhere,
this opposition was seen as important in demonstrating the potential
of opposition. Dam campaigns have been described as "dress-rehearsals"
for campaigns that eventually led to end of these regimes.
Opposition to dam projects has been especially prominent in
the South. In Thailand, years of opposition to dams led to the
announcement in 1995 that dams would no longer be built within
the country for power production (Thailand remains, however,
a potential major customer for power generated by dams in neighbouring
countries, particularly Laos). In India, the most prominent focus
of dissent has been the Sardar Sarovar project. For the last
ten years this project, involving construction of irrigation
canals and more than 30 dams, and resulting in the forced relocation
of perhaps 320,000 people, has elicited widespread opposition.
This opposition has led to the withdrawal of the World Bank from
the project, and to several delays in construction. Whatever
the outcome of this controversy, it is widely believed to have
encouraged the end of an era of dam projects in India requiring
large-scale displacement.
Especially noteworthy has been the formation of large-scale
international coalitions against dams, led by the International
Rivers Network. Just as dam-building has become an international
business, so too has opposition to dams. The spread of modern
communications technology (for example, the IRN's e-mail notification
system), has clearly contributed to this.
Several factors have encouraged widespread opposition to dams:
1) The fact that dams often affect many interests has led
to the formation of coalitions and alliances between different
parties. Fishers have combined with indigenous' peoples organizations,
and with environmentalists, for example, and in some cases the
resulting coalitions have matured into movements whose goals
go beyond opposition to a
specific project, towards the advocacy of alternative forms of
economic and political development.
2) As governments have sought to attract private investors
to dam projects, this has led to more open airing of the implications
of these projects, and to the publicizing of the fact that these
projects may not be secure or profitable investments, but often
rely on indirect or hidden subsidies. For example, the July 1996
report of the Delphi group of
investment consultants, demonstrating that the Bakun Dam was
a risky investment, has received wide attention.
3) The notion that problems caused by dams are not peculiar
to specific projects or regions, or are correctable through modification
or better management of the projects, but, rather, are inherent
in this form of technology. Goldsmith and Hildyard's compendium
of the environmental and social impacts of dams was one of the
first documents to gather
together the main arguments against dams, and to make this point.
The implication for popular opposition to these projects is that
the impacts of dams are not solvable through expertise, and therefore
decisions concerning dams cannot be delegated to expertise.
Many countries, including Malaysia, make some legal provision
for public participation in decisions concerning large projects
that may have environmental and social impacts. A variety of
criteria can be applied to the evaluation of these provisions,
such as transparency, access to information, accountability,
meaningful choice, and comprehensiveness of alternatives. More
generally, these or other criteria can be used to
evaluate decision-making, as conducted through an environmental
impact assessment process, for example, in terms of a few key
factors, such as legitimacy, fairness and efficiency. Also critical
is how "participation" in decisions is legally defined:
it may encompass shared responsibility for decisions, or merely
requirements for notification of
decisions.
Effective requirements for public participation in decisions
also depend on political will, enforced by open debate about
projects, and about the development process itself. Recent discussions
of the social role and character of debate and dissent has focused
on the concept of the "civil society" -- a political
context within which individuals, groups, civic
organizations of all types are able to express themselves, debate
their concerns, and, generally, mediate the relationship between
the state and the citizen. The recent history of the Bakun project
demonstrates how obstacles to a civil society can be formed by
restricting access to information, and by discouraging the questioning
of official priorities.
But it also demonstrates, paradoxically, how such a project can
contribute to a civil society. In Malaysia, as elsewhere, developments
eliciting immense environmental, social, and economic concerns
have often led to stronger organizations of concerned citizens,
because
such developments demonstrate so effectively the need for civic
oversight of the exercise of state and private authority.
Nevertheless, there remains considerable momentum behind building
dams. They still benefit powerful political and economic interests,
and in many countries, the process of planning, promoting and
building dams remains secretive and insulated from dissent. As
McCully concludes, "Those who suffer because of dams --
whether directly through the
loss of their livelihoods or indirectly through government subsidies
to uneconomic projects -- are rarely able to hold the dam-building
bureaucrats and consultants accountable for their actions."
In several countries, opposition to dam projects has been
answered by attempts to suppress this dissent. In China, activists
opposed to the Three Gorges and other dam projects have been
jailed. For example, the editor of Yangtze! Yangtze!,
a book critical of the Three Gorges project, spent 10 months
in solitary confinement. The book has also been banned in China.
Similarly, in India, thousands of opponents of the Sardar Sarovar
project have been subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, and
beatings, all of which appear to be part of a campaign by state
governments to discourage opposition to the project.
Ultimately, it is increasingly evident that dams are remaining
viable only in countries where dissent, and human rights generally,
are curbed. This is likely a major reason why China and southeast
Asia have become among the most active regions of dam building.
Sources:
o Fisher, William F., "Development
and Resistance in the Narmada Valley," in Fisher (1995),
pp. 3-46.
o Hall, Anthony, "Grassroots Action for Resettlement
Planning: Brazil and Beyond," World Development,
1994, 22(12): 1793-1809.
o McCully, Silenced Rivers, pp. 282-306, provides
capsule histories of opposition to dam projects, in the United
States, Tasmania, Eastern Europe, Brazil, Thailand and India.
o Taylor, Bron Raymond, ed., Ecological Resistance
Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism,
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). [Very useful world-wide survey of
popular movements. Frequent mention of opposition to dams.]
o Wiseman, Robin, "The writing on the dam,"
New Internationalist, May 1990: 13-15.
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