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Dams
represent one of the strongest manifestations of the urge to
dominate nature, regulate it, and turn it towards the uses of
humanity. They epitomize the notion that it is appropriate, even
necessary, for humans to assert control over nature: that a river
can't be allowed to exist free, following its own rhythm, but
that humanity must control it, using technology. The object of
a dam, ultimately, is to control, and place within rigid boundaries,
the dynamic vitality of a river in its interaction with the landscape
as it flows through it. As such, dams represent the triumph of
technology over nature:
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"Massive dams are much more than simply
machines to generate electricity and store water. They are concrete,
rock and earth expressions of the dominant ideology of the technological
age: icons of economic development and scientific progress to
match nuclear bombs and motor cars." |
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And as historian Theodore Steinberg
noted with reference to the Hoover Dam, the most famous American
dam: it "was supposed to signify greatness, power and domination.
It was planned that way."
Related to this perspective is the notion
that dams are important simply as a means of avoiding the "waste"
of nature. A similar idea has often been expressed, in widely
varying political contexts, that water allowed to flow to the
sea without being used for some human purpose, is "wasted":
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"Water which is allowed to enter
the sea is wasted."
Joseph Stalin, 1929
"Quebec is a vast hydroelectric
plant in the bud and everyday, millions of potential kilowatt-hours
flow downstream and out to sea. What a waste!"
Robert Bourassa, Power from the
North (1985)
"It is difficult to conceive of
a scenario in which India can afford to let the waters of a major
river such as the Narmada run wasted to the sea."
World Bank, 1987 |
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It has often been suggested that the
domination of nature is tied to the domination of people. As
C. S. Lewis wrote, "What we call Man's power over Nature
turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men
with Nature as its instrument." The interaction between
water development and political power has been debated for decades.
Most obviously, the assertion of human domination over a river
by a dam -- "taming" a "wild" river -- provides
a dramatic illustration of the might of the state that built
that dam. Karl Wittfogel wrote the classic and much debated work
on this interaction, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study
of Total Power (1957). A basic thesis was that great water
works necessitate centralized direction, large state enterprises,
and disciplined armies. Absolutist regimes of hydraulic societies
are usually governed by one person with concentrated power over
important decisions.
Max Horkheimer, the philosopher of the
Frankfurt School, wrote on the link between the exploitation
of nature and human beings; a link subtly reinforced by dams.
As Theodore Steinberg summarizes: "Modern capitalist societies,
Horkheimer felt, had lost their bearings, their sense of reason.
They were intent instead on domination for the sake of domination,
on dominating nature, man, and whatever else they could think
of. Out went moral reasoning, and in came a crusading urge to
manipulate and exploit. Whatever sacred value was once attached
to the natural world was stamped out by the instrumentalism and
calculation of expert engineers and others engaged in an irrational
quest to conquer and subdue. But little of this crosses the mind
of the average visitor on a trip to Hoover Dam, or any other
dam for that matter. What visitors tend to see is the glory of
it all, of nature outwitted by good old American ingenuity."
(Steinberg, "'That World's Fair Feeling': Control of Water
in 20th-Century America," 1993, 404-405).
This notion of a link between water
development and control over humans is also advanced by Donald
Worster in his Rivers of Empire. Just as many free-flowing
rivers have been imprisoned within the concrete walls of irrigation
canals, so too have centralized agencies such as the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers, by reshaping the
rivers of the American west, moved the region far from the ideal
of a frontier land in which individuals and communities could
determine their own destiny.
Simon Schama provides a useful overview
of some of these ideas concerning water development and politics:
While the rivers of the ancient world brought both the principle
of circulation to settled societies [bringing movement to stationary
settlements], they were also seen as the carriers of havoc &
death. For example, for the Nile, too little water
would bring starvation, sandstorms, anarchy; high water would
bring floods, saturation of seed stocks, parasites, blights,
invasion of sacred sites like the great temple at Karnak. One
of the nilometers calibrated not just the measure of the water
but its correlates in human fortune and misfortune: 12 cubits
denoted famine; 13, hunger; 14, cheerfulness; 15,
security; 16, delight. A failure of the Nile to perform according
to expectations almost certainly had serious political consequences,
and seems to have coincided with ruptures in the orderly succession
of the Pharoahs. What the river could authorize, it could also
take away.
Schama continues: A long tradition of
sociologists, from Karl Marx to Karl Wittfogel, have seen "hydraulic
societies" and despotism as functionally connected. In naturally
arid regions, they argued, only an absolutely obedient, virtually
enslaved regime could possibly have mobilized the concentrations
of labor needed to man & maintain the
irrigation canals and dikes on which intensive agriculture depended.
And Wittfogel, who went from being a devout Marxist to an equally
impassioned anti-Marxist, made no secret in the 1950s that he
saw in the Chinese and Soviet regimes further evidence that it
was as the arbiters of water that tyrannies anointed themselves
as legitimate. The colossal dam and the hydroelectric power station
as emblems of omnipotence were for modern despots what the Nile
irrigation canals were for the Pharaohs. Steaming along the Volga-Don
canal to which countless thousands of slave laborers had been
sacrificed, Stalin could proclaim himself the master of the waters.
Breasting his way down the Yangtze, at the head of regiments
of the swimming proletariat, Mao Tse-tung could affirm that he
was indeed the fluvial Emperor of the Masses: unsinkable, indestructible,
immortal. And through the Three Gorges Dam, flooding the most
famous icon of all China's river landscapes, Deng Xioping tried
to present himself in succession to the founder of the very first
dynasty, around 2200 B.C., the semilegendary emperor Yu (the
Chinese Osiris), whose authority was established on his mastery
of the flood, & the establishment of intensive, irrigated
agriculture.
Several examples exist of this relation
between political power and water development. Beginning in the
1930s, Stalin sought to reshape the Soviet landscape through
dams and canals, to demonstrate the power of the state through
its domination of nature. According to one Soviet official, "[t]he
more such projects contradicted the laws of nature, the more
highly they were regarded the more brilliantly the illusion of
their success demonstrated the power and wisdom of the new leaders
of the country." Until 1960, the main Soviet dam-building
agency, the Hydroproject Institute, was a subdivision of the
KGB. Secret police and dams were linked by the fact that only
the gulags could provide the huge labour force needed to build
the Soviet dams. In effect, these represented an effort to build
human progress thru the total control of nature -- to make "mad
rivers sane".
Sources:
o Pearce, The Dammed,
1992 (pp.100-114). [Describes the Soviet use of water development
as a demonstration of state power.]
Three other political implications of
water development include:
- the relationship between the centres of power within nations,
and the periphery or hinterland (as defined in geographic, economic
or political terms). This aspect has been apparent, for example,
in hydro developments in both Malaysia and Canada.
- the place of indigenous peoples in national economic and political
systems, and the disproportionate impact of dam projects on these
peoples.
- the assertion by particular agencies of their authority and
access to financial and political resources. As dam building
agencies grow in size and power they increasingly lose sight
of their original aims and come to confuse means with ends, as
their primary goal becomes protecting their budgets and activities.
Social theorists like Max Weber and Ivan Illich have argued that
this process is typical with bureaucracies.
Sources:
o Price, David H., "Wittfogel's
Neglected Hydraulic/Hydroagricultural Distinction," J.
Anthropological Research, 1994, 50: 187-204.
o Reisner, Marc, Cadillac Desert: The American West
and Its Disappearing Water, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre,
1986, 1993). [A classic account of the efforts by two water development
agencies: the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, to maintain their activities long after they had ceased
to serve a useful
social purpose.]
o Steinberg, Theodore, "'That World's Fair Feeling':
Control of Water in Twentieth Century America," Technology
and Culture, 1993, 34(2):.
o Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism: A Comparative
Study of Total Power, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1957).
o Worster, Donald, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity,
and the Growth of the American West, (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1985). [on the history of water development in the United
States. He also discusses (pp. 22-48) the implications of Wittfogel's
thesis for the history of American water resources.] |